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INTRODUCTION 
Think back to the last time you went to the grocery store. You 
might have purchased items such as ConAgra 100% natural cooking oil, 
Bayer aspirin, or a probiotic. Did you keep your receipt? It turns out 
that the 100% natural cooking oil you purchased was anything but 
100% natural. But because you did not keep your receipt, you have no 
recourse against the company.1 You cannot join a class action and 
vindicate your rights because of a judge-made doctrine—
ascertainability. The corporation’s conduct will go unpunished, and it 
will continue to mislead unwary consumers.2 
Ascertainability has become one of the most hotly contested issues 
in class action litigation.3 Recently, a growing number of class 
certification decisions are turning on an “implied” requirement of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23—that a proposed class must be 
ascertainable.4 A court can determine whether a proposed class is 
ascertainable without discovery, and many courts are willing to dispose 
 
1. Unless you can afford your own attorney. Most Americans, however, cannot 
spare the time or money it costs to litigate a case over a $6.98 bottle of cooking 
oil. “Most individuals are too preoccupied with daily life and too uninformed 
about the law to pay attention to whether they are being overcharged or otherwise 
inappropriately treated by those with whom they do business.” Deborah R. 
Hensler et al., Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for 
Private Gain 68 (2000). 
2. See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2013) reh’g denied, No. 2-
08-CV-04716, 2014 WL 3887938, at *2 (3d Cir. May 2, 2014) (“The [heightened 
ascertainability decision] gives fear that some wrongs will go unrighted because 
the wrongdoers successfully gamed the system.”) (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
3. Archis A. Parasharami & Hannah Chanoine, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Files 
Amicus Brief on Ascertainability in Key Ninth Circuit Case, Mayer Brown:  
Class Defense Blog (Feb. 3, 2015), https://www.classdefenseblog.com/2015/ 
02/u-s-chamber-of-commerce-ﬁles-amicus-brief-on-ascertainability-in-key-ninth-
circuit-case/ [https://perma.cc/3WKF-KSGH]. 
4. John H. Beisner et al., Ascertainability: Reading Between the Lines of Rule 23, 
12 Class Action Litig. Rep. 253, 253 (2011). 
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of class actions at the pleading stage.5 This ascertainability doctrine 
poses dire consequences to small-value consumer class actions. 
Circa 1970, courts began finding it “elementary that in order to 
maintain a class action, the class sought to be represented must 
be . . . clearly ascertainable.”6 But courts were not applying the 
ascertainability standard as a separate prerequisite to class certification 
as they are today.7 It is likely that courts did not find it necessary, 
especially given the types of class actions in federal court. At that time, 
a class action typically involved securities claims, where courts could 
easily identify class members from financial records.8 Consumer class 
actions were almost never brought in federal court, so courts avoided 
answering the tough ascertainability questions.9 
But Congress opened the doors to the federal courts for consumer 
class actions with the Class Action Fairness Act in 2005.10 The Act 
allows a class action to proceed under diversity jurisdiction so long as 
the class altogether seeks at least $5 million.11 Once Congress created a 
new way to establish jurisdiction in federal courts, plaintiffs brought 
 
5. Id. 
6. DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970). About ten years 
later, the Seventh Circuit adopted the ascertainability requirement. See Simer 
v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 669–70 (7th Cir. 1981) (denying class certification due to 
the fact that the court would expend large amounts of time and money identifying 
the members of the class). See also Jamie Zysk Isani & Jason B. Sherry, The 
Ascendancy of Ascertainability as a Threshold Requirement for Certification, 16 
Class Action Litig. Rep. 525, 526 (2015) (“Today, [DeBremaecker and Simer] 
are best known for founding the rule that ascertainability requires a class that is 
defined according to ‘objective’ criteria . . . .”).  
7. Lindsay Breedlove, Rule 23’s Implicit Ascertainability Requirement: A 
Brewing Class Action Controversy, Woman Advoc. Committee (A.B.A., 
Chi., Ill.), Spring 2016, at 9–10. See also Tom Murphy, Comment, Implied Class 
Warfare: Why Rule 23 Needs an Explicit Ascertainability Requirement in the 
Wake of Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 57 B.C. L. Rev. Electronic Supplement 
34, 39 (2016), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 
3488&context=bclr [https://perma.cc/2AN2-K3K3] (noting that ascertainability 
was not controversial at first). 
8. Murphy, supra note 7, at 39 n.26. 
9. Id. at 39 n.27 (noting that consumer class actions seldom met the requirements 
for diversity jurisdiction because each class member needed to satisfy the amount 
in controversy requirement); see also id. (“Subject matter jurisdiction in federal 
court was typically unattainable for consumer class actions because consumers 
did not have standing to sue under the federal laws meant to protect consumers 
from corporate misconduct, like false advertising.”). 
10. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715 
(2012). 
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012). 
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class actions, and the federal courts could no longer hide from 
addressing the ascertainability requirement. 
This Note explores the controversy over the heightened ascertain-
ability requirement and its effect on small-value consumer class actions. 
Part I explains the class-action requirements under Rule 23 and 
ascertainability’s textual origins. Part II explores ascertainability’s 
different forms and explains the policy arguments supporting each ver-
sion. Part II also argues that the policy rationales supporting the 
heightened ascertainability standard do not pass muster. The 
heightened requirement should be abandoned in favor of a weaker stan-
dard. Part III explores the possibility that class plaintiffs will likely face 
the heightened standard with increasing frequency and proposes ways 
that class plaintiffs can combat the heightened standard. 
I. Rule 23’s Requirements and Ascertainability’s 
Origins 
Before delving into the ascertainability debate, one should 
understand Rule 23’s requirements for class actions in federal court and 
where the ascertainability doctrine originated. Because class actions are 
meant to be an exception to the normal rule that requires litigating 
claims individually,12 plaintiffs cannot file class actions as they would 
an ordinary lawsuit. Typically, an individual plaintiff initiates a lawsuit 
by simply filing a complaint with the court. Class actions are more 
complicated. A district court must certify the class before the litigation 
can proceed.13 During this certification process, the district court thor-
oughly examines the plaintiffs’ class-action proposal. The judge must 
ensure the class meets several certification requirements before allowing 
the class to move forward. 
Those certification requirements are explicitly laid out in Rule 23. 
To be certified, the class must satisfy four prerequisites—numerosity,14 
commonality,15 typicality,16 and adequacy17—and then fit into one of 
 
12. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348 (2011). 
13. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A). 
14. “[T]he class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). 
15. “[T]here are questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(a)(2).	  
16. “[T]he claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims 
or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). 
17. “[T]he representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of 
the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). 
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three categories.18 Relevant here, classes fall under the third category, 
23(b)(3), when “questions of law or fact common to class members 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members” and 
when “a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly 
and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”19 Once the judge believes 
these requirements are met and certifies the class, the certification order 
must include a class definition.20 
Defining a class is not an easy task. The class definition must be 
“concrete, objective, and closely tailored to the facts giving rise to the 
claims.”21 This definition allows potential class members to receive no-
tice of the proceeding and understand their right to opt out of the class. 
The class definition dictates who benefits from a verdict or settlement 
if a class prevails, and explains which members are precluded from filing 
another suit alleging the same injury.22 
As if all these requirements were not enough, courts recently began 
imposing an additional prerequisite to class certification—
ascertainability.23 “Ascertainability” is not mentioned in Rule 23; 
instead, the doctrine is judicially crafted.24 No one can agree upon one 
particular textual source, but courts point to a few places in Rule 23 
that could lend support to the ascertainability doctrine. 25 
First, Rule 23(a) refers to a “class” upon which the prerequisites 
are imposed. Some courts infer that this “class” requires a definite or 
ascertainable class.26 These courts argue that they cannot apply the 
Rule 23(a) prerequisites without first knowing who belongs to the 
class.27 Second, Rule 23(c)(1)(B) requires that a certification order 
 
18. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). 
19. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
20. “An order that certifies a class action must define the class . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 23(c)(1)(B). 
21. Jordan Elias, The Ascertainability Landscape and the Modern Affidavit, 84 
Tenn. L. Rev. 1, 7–8 (2016). 
22. Id. at 8. 
23. See 1 William B. Rubenstein et al., Newberg on Class Actions 
§ 3:1, at 151 (5th ed. 2011) [hereinafter Newberg] (referring to ascertainability 
as an “implicit requirement” of Rule 23). 
24. Myriam Gilles et al., Panel, The Current State of the Consumer Class Action, 
11 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 647, 651 (2015). 
25. Daniel Luks, Note, Ascertainability in the Third Circuit: Name that Class 
Member, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 2359, 2369 (2014) (citing Newberg, supra 
note 23, § 3:2, at 155–56). 
26. Newberg, supra note 23, § 3:2, at 155.  
27. See id. at 158 (“[C]ourts state that they must be able to know who belongs to 
a class before they can determine the numerosity of the class, the commonality 
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“define the class and the class claims, issues, or defenses,” and “appoint 
class counsel.”28 A small number of courts believe this rule requires that 
the class be ascertainable.29 These courts argue that the required class 
definition must be specific enough to identify the class members. Third, 
courts that advocate for a stricter version of ascertainability believe 
that the doctrine could be implied from the manageability inquiry under 
23(b)(3) and 23(b)(3)(D).30 Rule 23(b)(3) requires that “a class action 
is superior to other” dispute-resolution methods and Rule 23(b)(3)(D) 
goes further to require a district court to consider “the likely difficulties 
in managing a class action.”31 These courts believe that if it is not 
administratively feasible to ascertain the class members, then the class 
action may not be superior to other available dispute-resolution meth-
ods.32 
II. The Three-Way Split on Ascertainability 
Over roughly the past decade, almost every circuit has weighed in 
on the ascertainability debate.33 Once the dust settled, three approaches 
 
of the claims of the class members, or any of the other class certification 
prerequisites.”); see, e.g., Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(“Ascertainability . . . allows a trial court [to] effectively . . . evaluate the explicit 
requirements of Rule 23. . . . [T]he independent ascertainability inquiry ensures 
that a proposed class will function as a class.”); In re Teflon Products Liability 
Litig., 254 F.R.D. 354, 361 n.11 (S.D. Iowa 2008) (“[T]he court simply finds an 
evaluation of the class definition to be the logical first step in the analysis.”). 
28. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B). 
29. This rule provides: “An order that certifies a class action must define the class 
and the class claims, issues, or defenses. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B). 
See also Newberg, supra note 23, § 3:2, at 158–59 (“[S]ome district courts 
now specifically cite Rule 23(c)(1)(B) as authority for the implied definiteness 
requirement.”). 
30. For a discussion of the heightened ascertainability standard, see infra Part II. 
See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (“A class action may be maintained if . . . a 
class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 
adjudicating the controversy.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D) (“The matters 
pertinent to these findings include . . . the likely difficulties in managing a class 
action.”). 
31. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D). 
32. 1 Joseph M. McLaughlin, McLaughlin on Class Actions § 4:2 (13th 
ed. 2017). 
33. See, e.g., In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2015); Brecher 
v. Republic of Arg., 806 F.3d 22, 24–25 (2d Cir. 2015); Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 
784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015); EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 358 
(4th Cir. 2014); Frey v. First Nat’l Bank Sw., 602 F. App’x 164, 168 (5th Cir. 
2015); Rikos v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497, 525 (6th Cir. 2015); 
Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657–58 (7th Cir. 2015); Sandusky 
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to ascertainability emerged. Those approaches are most easily under-
stood when placed on a spectrum based on how difficult it is to satisfy 
each standard. 
On one end, the Third Circuit created a heightened standard that 
requires the plaintiff to make two showings: first, the class must be 
“defined with reference to objective criteria,” and second, there must 
be a “reliable and administratively feasible mechanism for determining 
whether putative class members fall within the class definition.”34 On 
the other end, the Eighth Circuit believes that the extra ascertainability 
standard is unnecessary as long as the district court rigorously applies 
Rule 23’s requirements.35 Somewhere in the middle lie the Sixth, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. These courts acknowledge that there is a 
preliminary ascertainability requirement, but they only require that the 
class members be identified with reference to objective criteria.36 
Because Rule 23 does not contain an explicit ascertainability 
requirement, courts ultimately make a policy judgment when choosing 
which standard to adopt. They weigh the policies behind the rule and 
decide which policies are more important. Courts that adopt the height-
ened ascertainability standard strongly believe that unascertainable 
classes violate the defendant’s due process rights. Courts that adopt the 
weaker ascertainability standard value consumer class actions and fear 
that the heightened standard renders them null. 
This Part explores the policy rationales behind the different 
ascertainability requirements. Although heightened ascertainability 
proponents cite numerous policy reasons supporting the standard, 
ultimately, they do not pass muster. Many of the policy arguments are 
easily refuted, and the threat to consumer class actions is too great to 
justify the heightened standard. 
A. The Policies Behind the Third Circuit’s Heightened Ascertainability 
Standard 
The Third Circuit’s standard lies on one end of the ascertainability 
spectrum. Most courts find a class ascertainable when the court can use 
objective criteria to identify class members. But the Third Circuit 
created an additional requirement: the plaintiffs must prove that there 
 
Wellness Ctr., LLC v. Medtox Sci., Inc., 821 F.3d 992, 996–98 (8th Cir. 2016); 
Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1133 (9th Cir. 2017); Bussey v. 
Macon Cty. Greyhound Park, Inc., 562 F. App’x 782, 787–88 (11th Cir. 2014). 
34. Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163 (quoting Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 
355 (3d Cir. 2013)). 
35. See Sandusky Wellness Ctr., 821 F.3d at 996. 
36. See Rikos, 799 F.3d at 525; Mullins, 795 F.3d at 672; Briseno, 844 F.3d at 1133. 
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is an administratively feasible mechanism for identifying class mem-
bers.37 When developing this standard, the court weighed numerous 
policy considerations but ultimately focused on the administrative 
difficulties of managing an unascertainable class and the risk of vio-
lating the defendant’s due process rights. 
1. Unascertainable Classes Violate the Rules Enabling Act 
The Rules Enabling Act ensures that the rules of civil procedure 
will not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”38 
Heightened ascertainability proponents argue that unascertainable 
classes violate the Rules Enabling Act because members who would 
otherwise be unable to make valid claims individually are allowed to 
bring their claims as a class. If a person unable to make a claim 
individually can somehow state a claim as a class member, then Rule 
23 would be enlarging that individual’s substantive right contrary to 
the Rules Enabling Act. 
Further, a plaintiff’s ability to hold a defendant liable cannot 
depend on whether he brings a case as a class or individually.39 After 
all, “[w]ho could dispute that if a named plaintiff brought an individual 
lawsuit against a company about a particular product, he would have 
to prove at trial that he purchased the challenged product and was 
injured as a result?”40 These heightened ascertainability proponents ar-
gue that without a reliable and administratively feasible method to 
identify class members, defendants have no way of challenging class 
 
37. In Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583 (3d Cir. 2012), the Third 
Circuit “transformed [ascertainability] into a sweeping new independent 
requirement for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) actions—a requirement 
mentioned nowhere in Rule 23.” Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions in the Year 
2026: A Prognosis, 65 Emory L.J. 1569, 1605 (2016). See also Byrd, 784 F.3d 
at 163 (articulating the Third Circuit’s two-pronged ascertainability standard). 
38. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). 
39. See, e.g., Phillip Morris USA, Inc. v. Scott, 131 S. Ct. 1, 4 (2010) (implying 
that due process is violated if “individual plaintiffs who could not recover had 
they sued separately can recover only because their claims were aggregated with 
others’ through the procedural device of the class action.”); Carrera v. Bayer 
Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (2013) (noting that “[i]f this were an individual claim, 
a plaintiff would have to prove at trial he purchased WeightSmart” and that a 
“defendant in a class action” has the same “due process right to raise individual 
challenges and defenses to claims . . . .”). 
40. State of Class Actions Ten Years After the Enactment of the Class Action 
Fairness Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution and Civil 
Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 20 (2015) [hereinafter 
Hearing] (statement of Andrew J. Pincus, Partner, Mayer Brown LLP). 
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membership, “short of extensive individual fact-finding and an unman-
ageable series of mini-trials.”41 Therefore, class members without valid 
claims will go unnoticed and remain within the class. 
But these advocates take for granted the defendant’s ability to 
“oppose the class representatives’ showings at every stage” of the liti-
gation.42 A district court could certify a class action and allow the 
parties to conduct discovery. The additional discovery could allow class 
members to more thoroughly identify themselves than they would be 
able to at the certification stage. Moreover, commentators point out 
that “the [Supreme] Court has never found a Rule invalid for imper-
missibly affecting a substantive right”43 and that there is “no real 
consensus” about “how the Act should be interpreted.”44 Therefore, 
instead of rejecting the class action at the certification stage, the court 
should let the class proceed to discovery. Then, if class members are 
still unidentifiable, the defendant can file a motion to dismiss. 
2. Unascertainable Classes Threaten the Defendant’s Due Process 
Rights 
Due process allows defendants to challenge the plaintiff’s 
evidentiary showing by cross-examination and to resolve factual 
disputes in front of a court or a jury. Heightened ascertainability pro-
ponents argue that defendants cannot exercise those due process rights 
on unascertainable classes. 45 Small-value consumer class-action plain-
tiffs typically rely solely on affidavits because most consumers do not 
keep their receipts. A defendant cannot realistically cross-examine every 
class member, especially when class membership can be in the millions. 
Without another feasible way to challenge class membership, the 
 
41. Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellee at 6, Jones v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 
3:12-CV–01633-CRB, 2014 WL 2702726 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2014), appeal 
docketed, No. 14-16327 (9th Cir. July 15, 2014) [hereinafter Chamber of 
Commerce Brief]. See, e.g., Oscar v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 274 F.R.D. 498, 
513 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[D]etermining whether each tire failed as a result of the 
allegedly concealed defect or as a result of unrelated issues . . . will devolve into 
numerous mini-trials.”). 
42. Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1131 (9th Cir. 2017). 
43. Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive Rights” (in the Rules Enabling Act) 
More Seriously, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 47, 48 (1998). 
44. Martin H. Redish & Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and the 
Procedural-Substantive Tension: A Lesson in Statutory Interpretation, 93 
Minn. L. Rev. 26, 27 (2008). 
45. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 340 (2011)(“Because Rule 23 
cannot be interpreted to abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right, . . . a 
class cannot be certified on the premise that [the defendant] will not be entitled 
to litigate its . . . defenses to individual claims.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 1·2017 
Navigating the Ascertainability Spectrum 
222 
defendant’s due process rights are violated.46 Courts that adopt the 
heightened standard require class members to prove their membership 
by verifying their affidavits, ensuring that there are no fraudulent 
claims.47 The Third Circuit explained that the plaintiff should present 
a model of how to reliably screen affidavits for honesty and accuracy.48 
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits reject this argument. In Mullins v. 
Direct Digital, LLC,49 the Seventh Circuit claimed that the heightened 
ascertainability requirement renders “affidavits from putative class 
members . . . insufficient as a matter of law.”50 In Briseno v. ConAgra 
Foods, Inc.,51 the Ninth Circuit questioned how an affidavit that would 
be sufficient to force liability at other stages in the proceeding would 
then be insufficient at the certification stage.52 For example, if 
undisputed, a self-serving affidavit could support a defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment.53 In fact, there is only one type of case where 
the testimony of one witness is legally insufficient to prove a fact.54 
Therefore, this rule should be extended to small-value consumer class 
actions. 
 
46. Gilles, supra note 24, at 652 (“[T]he problem with . . . oath[s or affidavits] is 
that a defendant has the right—according to courts that adopt ascertainability 
analysis— . . . to cross examine every single claimant on the oath, on the injury, 
[or] on the purchase.”); see also Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 
583, 594 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Forcing [the defendants] to accept as true absent 
persons’ declarations that they are members of the class, without further indicia 
of reliability, would have serious due process implications.”). 
47. Sarah R. Cansler, An “Insurmountable Hurdle” to Class Action Certification? 
The Heightened Ascertainability Requirement’s Effect on Small Consumer 
Claims, 94 N.C. L. Rev. 1382, 1397 (2016). 
48. Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 311–12 (3d Cir. 2013). 
49. 795 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016). 
50. Id. at 661. 
51. 844 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2017). 
52. Id. at 1132 (“Given that a consumer’s affidavit could force a liability 
determination at trial without offending the Due Process Clause, we see no reason 
to refuse class certification simply because that same consumer will present her 
affidavit in a claims administration process after a liability determination has 
already been made.”). 
53. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (“A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is 
genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts 
of materials in the record, including . . . affidavits . . . .”). 
54. See U.S. Const., art. III, § 3 (“No [p]erson shall be convicted of Treason unless 
on the [t]estimony of two [w]itnesses to the same overt [a]ct, or on [c]onfession 
in open [c]ourt.”). 
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3. Each Fraudulent Class Member Affects the Defendant’s Total 
Liability Because a Court Should Not Aggregate Damages 
Unascertainable class members make it difficult for a court to 
determine a defendant’s liability to the class members. Heightened 
ascertainability proponents argue that each individual class member 
affects the defendant’s total liability because a class defendant is only 
liable to those class members who can prove their claim by “actual 
damages.”55 A court cannot make these liability determinations without 
first identifying those class members.56 
Heightened ascertainability proponents reject class plaintiffs’ 
argument that the defendant’s total liability can be calculated in the 
aggregate based on total sales or revenue with unclaimed funds distrib-
uted by cy pres.57 Proponents point out that this approach is used in 
settlement cases and has repeatedly been rejected in litigated class 
actions.58 
But the Ninth Circuit argues the opposite—the defendant’s total 
liability is independent of whether any individual class member suffered 
 
55. Brief of Appellants Bayer Corporation and Bayer Healthcare, LLC in 
Opposition to Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 18–
27, Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 12-2621, 2014 WL 3887938 (3d Cir. Dec. 30, 
2013) [hereinafter Bayer’s Brief Against Rehearing]. The Chamber of Commerce 
recently made a similar argument. See Chamber of Commerce Brief, supra note 
41, at 14–15 (arguing that a fluid recovery method violates the defendant’s due 
process rights); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(stating that even if Rule 23 could be read as to permit fluid recovery, “the 
courts would have to reject it as an unconstitutional violation of the 
requirement of due process of law”). 
56. See Rollins, Inc. v. Butland, 951 So. 2d 860, 873 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d 2006) 
(“The members of the putative class who experienced no actual loss have no 
claim for damages under FDUTPA.”) 
57. Chamber of Commerce Brief, supra note 41, at 14. Cy Pres is used “to distribute 
unclaimed portions of a class-action judgment or settlement funds to a charity 
that will advance the interests of the class.” Cy Pres, Black’s Law 
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Black’s Dictionary points out that “[m]ore 
recently, courts have used cy pres to distribute class-action-settlement funds 
not amenable to individual claims or to a meaningful pro rata distribution to a 
nonprofit charitable organization whose work indirectly benefits the class 
members and advances the public interest.” Id. 
58. McLaughlin, supra note 32, § 8:16 (“Though aggregate classwide damages 
are not per se unlawful, courts have repeatedly rejected the use of fluid recovery 
or its equivalent as a substitute for individualized proof when the class pursues 
claims that seek redress for individualized injuries.”); see also 32 Am. Jur. 2d 
Federal Courts § 1886 (2007) (“[C]ourts have rejected the ‘fluid class’ recovery 
concept as a method of reducing the manageability problems involved in a class 
action.”). 
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damages.59 In most cases, a defendant “will generally know how many 
units of a product it sold in the geographic area in question.”60 The 
court explained that “if the defendant is ultimately found to have 
charged . . . 10 cents more per unit than it could have without the 
challenged sales practice, the aggregate amount of liability will be 
determinable even if the identity of all class members is not.”61 The 
opinion even points out that the Third Circuit recognized this in 
Carrera v. Bayer Corp.62 
The Ninth Circuit’s argument is also followed by a regarded treatise 
on the subject. Newberg on Class Action states that “courts have 
generally rejected the argument that a plaintiff’s ability to demonstrate 
only aggregate damages violates a defendant’s due process and/or jury 
rights to confront and contest each individual’s right to damages.”63 
Courts have repeatedly stated that “[t]he use of aggregate damages cal-
culations is well established in federal court and implied by the very 
existence of the class action mechanism itself.”64 If plaintiffs provide the 
court with a common methodology for calculating individual damages, 
“even leaving such calculations for a succeeding proceeding[,] proof of 
aggregate damages may suffice.”65 
Plus, the defendant does not have a property interest in whether 
any particular individual is a class member.66 Procedural due process 
 
59. Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting 
that the defendant’s liability could be determined in the aggregate). See also Brief 
of Public Justice, P.C. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee 
Carrera’s Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 3–5, Carrera v. 
Bayer Corp., No. 12-2621, 2014 WL 3887938 (3d Cir. Oct. 4, 2013) [hereinafter 
Public Justice Brief] (arguing that the defendant’s total liability can be determined 
in the aggregate). 
60. Briseno, 844 F.3d at 1132. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. (citing Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 310 (3d Cir. 2013)). 
63. Newberg, supra note 23, § 12:2, at 95–96. 
64. In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 582 F.3d 156, 197 (1st Cir. 
2009). See Newberg, supra note 23, § 12:2, at 96 n.10 (collecting cases). 
65. Newberg, supra note 23, § 12:2, at 96–97. 
66. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972) (explaining 
that procedural due process protections apply only to the deprivation of a party’s 
constitutionally-protected interest in liberty or property). After certifying a 
damages class under Rule 23(b)(3), “courts determine extent of defendant’s 
monetary liability to the class.” Unopposed Motion of Professors of Civil 
Procedure and Complex Litigation for Leave to file Amici Curiae Brief in Support 
of Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 5–6, Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 12-2621, 
2014 WL 3887938 (3d Cir. Oct. 4, 2013) [hereinafter Law Professors’ Brief]. Once 
the court establishes aggregate damages, “the defendant has no interest in the 
addition or subtraction of members from the class roster.” Id. at 6. 
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requirements apply only when an individual is deprived of an interest 
included within the Constitution’s protection of liberty or property.67 
“Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains 
what process is due.”68 In class actions seeking compensatory damages, 
the defendant may have a property interest in “pay[ing] damages reflec-
tive of [its] actual liability”—but no more.69 
If a court can determine a defendant’s liability only by adding 
together the individual damages each class member suffered, then the 
defendant’s property interest is implicated by whether each person is 
actually a class member. But if a court can determine a defendant’s 
liability without tallying each individual class member’s damages, the 
defendant’s due process rights are not violated as long as the defendant 
can present defenses to the plaintiff’s proof and methodology by which 
its total liability is determined.70 
4. Courts Cannot Direct the Required Notices to an Unascertainable 
Class 
Rule 23 requires that class members receive notice of the litigation 
so that they can opt out of the class.71 If class members do not receive 
this required notice, then they can argue that they are not bound by 
the class judgment.72 Heightened ascertainability proponents argue that 
the court cannot direct the “best notice” to class members who cannot 
be identified. 
In addition, recent empirical evidence suggests that when a court 
cannot identify the class members—and as a result, most members did 
 
67. See Bd. of Regents, 408 U.S. at 569. 
68. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. 
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). 
69. McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 231 (2d Cir. 2008). 
70. When it is undisputed that the class damages can be accurately calculated from 
sales figures, then “the defendants are [not] constitutionally entitled to compel a 
parade of individual plaintiffs to establish damages.” In re Antibiotic Antitrust 
Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
71. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (“For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), 
the court must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under 
the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be 
identified through reasonable effort.”); see also Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 
154, 165 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The separate ascertainability requirement ensures that 
class members can be identified after certification . . . and therefore better 
prepares a district court to direct . . . the best notice that is practicable under 
the circumstances.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
72. See McLaughlin, supra note 32, § 4:2 (noting that “[i]t would be unconstitutional 
to bind class members to an adverse judgment if they could not determine from 
the notice whether they were in the class and thus had no meaningful ability to 
opt out”). 
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not receive direct notice—the class action is not beneficial. Proponents 
point to a study performed by a senior consultant who oversees and 
implements legal notice campaigns.73 The consultant found that based 
on “hundreds of class settlements, . . . consumer class action settlements 
with little or no direct mail notice will almost always have a claims rate 
of less than one percent.”74 This means that “approximately 99.98% of 
class members receive no benefit at all.”75 
The Ninth Circuit counters this argument by pointing out that Rule 
23 does not require actual notice to all class members in all cases.76 Rule 
23 only requires that the court direct “the best notice that is practicable 
under the circumstances”77 and recognizes that ‘‘it might be impossible 
to identify some class members for purposes of actual notice.”78 
Moreover, alternative notice methods have been settled law for more 
than sixty years.79 So long as the notice is reasonably calculated, public-
cation notice would be acceptable for unidentifiable class members.80 
5. Fraudulent Claims Could Reduce Bona Fide Class Members’ Relief 
Heightened ascertainability proponents fear that individuals will 
falsify their affidavits, which dilutes bona fide class members’ recov-
ery.81 This concern may seem valid in theory, but “in practice, the risk 
 
73. See Declaration of Deborah McComb Re Settlement Claims ¶ 1, Poertner v. 
Gillette Co., No. 6:12-CV-00803-GAP-DAB, 2014 WL 11210747 (M.D. Fla. 
Apr. 22, 2014) [hereinafter Declaration]. 
74. Id. ¶ 5. 
75. Chamber of Commerce Brief, supra note 41, at 33. 
76. See Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(“[N]either Rule 23 nor the Due Process Clause requires actual notice to each 
individual class member.”). 
77. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 
78. Briseno, 844 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 
665 (7th Cir. 2015)). 
79. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) 
(“[N]otice [must be] reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to 
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an 
opportunity to present their objections.”). 
80. See Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) § 21.311 (2004) 
(detailing forms of notice, other than first-class mail, that courts regularly 
approve when “individual names or addresses cannot be obtained through 
reasonable efforts” and citing representative cases). 
81. See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 310 (3d Cir. 2013) (“It is unfair to 
absent class members if there is a significant likelihood their recovery will be 
diluted by fraudulent or inaccurate claims.”). But Professor Gilles observes that 
“in practice only a tiny, tiny fraction of eligible claimants ever put in for recovery, 
so denying class certification because that tiny fraction . . . [is going to dilute 
claims] just doesn’t seem to really make much sense.” Gilles et al., supra note 24, 
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of dilution . . . seems low, perhaps to the point of being negligible.”82 
According to Public Citizen, Inc., a non-profit consumer advocacy 
group, there have been only ten successful collateral attacks since Rule 
23 was created.83 Out of those ten, only two involved collateral attacks 
against Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, which is important because the 
ascertainability requirement usually only applies to Rule 23(b)(3) 
cases.84 Public Citizen points out that none of these successful collateral 
attacks involved an issue with ascertaining class members or an asser-
tion that some class members’ interests were “diluted by fraudulent or 
inaccurate claims.”85 Therefore, this concern is misplaced. 
Without the heightened ascertainability requirement, there would 
be no meaningful way to tell which claims were fraudulent. But even if 
the concern was more serious, it could be addressed more effectively. If 
fraudulent claims materially reduce bona fide class members’ relief, 
these individuals may argue that the named plaintiff did not adequately 
represent their interests.86 Class members who are not adequately 
 
at 653. She continues by stating that class certification in cases like Bayer is the 
only way individuals receive compensation because “who, after all, is going to file 
a claim for fourteen dollars? I think in effect we’re just depriving potential 
claimants of all recovery, which again just doesn’t make much sense.” Id.   
82. Briseno, 844 F.3d at 1130 (quoting Mullins, 795 F.3d at 667). See also Brief 
Amicus Curiae of Public Citizen, Inc. in Support of Petition for Rehearing or 
Rehearing En Banc at 11, Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 12-2621, 2014 WL 
2887938 (3d Cir. Oct. 2, 2013), [hereinafter Public Citizen Brief] (“The notion 
that non-class-members will submit fraudulent or otherwise faulty affidavits, 
under penalty of perjury, . . . in the hope of collecting $8.99, . . . or even 
$84.95 . . . is, . . . far-fetched.”). 
83. Public Citizen Brief, supra note 82, at 8 n.6 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 
32 (1940); Hecht v. United Collection Bureau, Inc., 691 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2012); 
Beer v. United States, 671 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Stephenson v. Dow 
Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001), aff’d by an equally divided court, 539 
U.S. 111 (2003); Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992); 
Twigg v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 153 F.3d 1222, 1223-24 (11th Cir. 1998); 
Johnson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1979); Bogard v. Cook, 
586 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1978); Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973); 
Pate v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.C. 2004); Cf. In re Real Estate 
Title & Settlement Servs. Antitrust Litig., 869 F.2d 760 (3d Cir. 1989) (reversing 
anti-suit injunction against collateral attack on class judgment but not ruling on 
the propriety of the attack)). 
84. Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 252, vacated and remanded in part, and aff’d by an 
equally divided court in part, 539 U.S. 111, 112 (2003); Twigg, 153 F.3d at 1223–
24 (11th Cir. 1998); Public Citizen Brief, supra note 82, at 8; Newberg, supra 
note 23, § 3:7, at 172 (“[I]t is not clear that the implied requirement of definiteness 
should apply to Rule 23(b)(2) class actions at all.”). 
85. Public Citizen Brief, supra note 82, at 8–9 (internal quotations omitted). 
86. Carrera, 727 F.3d at 310. 
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represented are not bound by the judgment.87 Those individuals could 
then bring another action against the defendant and possibly apply 
issue preclusion to prevent the defendant from relitigating its liability.88 
6. Unascertainable Classes Compensate Uninjured Class Members 
Ascertainability proponents fear that unascertainable classes will 
compensate individuals who did not suffer an injury. As previously 
mentioned, if a defendant is unable to specifically identify class mem-
bers, then the defendant cannot challenge that person’s claim. This runs 
the risk that uninjured individuals will share in any recovery. 
Commentators challenge this logic as ignoring reality in two ways. 
First, only a tiny fraction of eligible claimants ever make submissions 
to class administrators in consumer cases.89 As the Ninth Circuit 
pointed out, “consistently low participation rates in consumer class 
actions make it very unlikely that non-deserving claimants would 
diminish the recovery of participating, bona fide class members.”90 
Second, denying class certification effectively denies the only meaning-
ful possibility for compensation at all. Without class certification, 
“deserving class members will receive nothing, for they would not have 
brought suit individually in the first place.”91 Moreover, this issue can 
be resolved through Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance inquiry, not a 
separate ascertainability requirement.92 
7. Attorneys Receive All the Benefit from Consumer Class Actions 
Courts and advocates alike assert that consumer class actions bring 
no real benefit to class members, but instead provide a windfall for 
attorneys. They claim that “[t]he only winner . . . is not the class 
 
87. See Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 42 (explaining that due process requires the interests 
of absent class members to be adequately represented for them to be bound by 
the judgment). 
88. Carrera, 727 F.3d at 310. See also Luks, supra note 25, at 2394 (explaining that 
“[a]scertainability should serve primarily as a requirement to ensure the 
workability of claim preclusion”); McLaughlin, supra note 32, § 4:2 (“[An 
amorphous class definition] call[s] into question the extent to which the court’s 
rulings and a jury’s determination will be binding on the parties.”). 
89. See Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action 
Problems and Class Action Settlements, 59 Fla. L. Rev. 71, 120 (2007) (citing 
instances of “shockingly low participation rates”). 
90. Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1130 (9th Cir. 2017). 
91. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
92. See, e.g., Torres v. Mercer Canyons Inc., 835 F.3d 1125, 1136–39 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(addressing the defendant’s claim that the class definition was overbroad, and 
thus arguably contained some members who were not injured, as a Rule 23(b)(3) 
predominance issue). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 1·2017 
Navigating the Ascertainability Spectrum 
229 
members—who stand to recover little, if they can be identified at all—
but class counsel—who has now been handed extraordinary leverage to 
negotiate a settlement and its fee.”93 
While this may be a legitimate concern, the solution is not a 
heightened ascertainability standard that does not give legitimate con-
sumer classes a fighting chance. Instead, courts and opposing counsel 
should rely on sanctions. Under Rule 11, attorneys certify that any 
court filing is made for a proper purpose, is not meant to harass, and is 
not frivolous.94 If either the court or opposing counsel believes the 
plaintiff’s attorney violated Rule 23, the court or opposing counsel could 
file a motion for sanctions.95 Even the threat of sanctions could be 
enough to deter plaintiffs’ attorneys’ misconduct.96 A separate prelim-
inary certification requirement is unnecessary. 
8. Unascertainable Classes Cause an Administrative Headache 
Without an administratively feasible mechanism for the court to 
determine if an individual is a class member, heightened ascertainability 
proponents argue that the court must conduct mini-trials for each 
person’s claim.97 This process is time-consuming and expensive. The 
drafters intended Rule 23 to create judicial efficiency, and an ill-defined 
class can waste judicial resources.98 Courts point out that consumer 
 
93. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Direct Dig., LLC, v. Mullins, 136 S. Ct. 
1161 (2016) (No. 15-549). See also Luks, supra note 25, at 2359 (“Judges have 
often shown hostility towards certification of frivolous class actions that result 
in large fees for attorneys but little recovery for class members.”). 
94. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (“By presenting to the court a pleading, written 
motion, or other paper . . . an attorney . . . certifies that to the best of the 
person’s knowledge . . . it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such 
as to harass . . . [and that] the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are 
warranted by existing law . . . .”). 
95. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) (describing how opposing counsel could file a 
motion for sanctions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(3) (“On its own, the court may 
order an attorney . . . to show cause why conduct specifically described in the 
order has not violated Rule 11(b).”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1) (“If . . . the 
court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an 
appropriate sanction on any attorney . . . that violated the rule or is responsible 
for the violation.”). 
96. See Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 Nw. U. 
L. Rev. 943, 985 (1992) (finding that if all aspects of Rule 11-related behavior 
are considered “a remarkable eighty-two percent of the respondents report 
having been affected by the Rule”). 
97. McLaughlin, supra note 32, § 4:2. 
98. Id.; see also Cansler, supra note 47, at 1394 (“[I]f putative class members cannot 
provide objective proof of their claims, a class action becomes unwieldly, . . . [and] 
the heightened ascertainability requirement avoids lengthy and costly litigation 
that undermines Rule 23(b)(3)’s efficiency requirement.”). 
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class members are unlikely to retain receipts, which could present 
“daunting administrative challenges,” rendering the class action 
unfeasible.99 
But both the Ninth and Seventh Circuits disagree. The Ninth 
Circuit points out that defendants do not have a “due process right to 
a cost-effective procedure for challenging every individual claim to class 
membership.”100 The explicit efficiency requirements and the manage-
ability factor under Rule 23(b)(3) sufficiently ensure that a class action 
is superior.101 The administrative feasibility requirement “conflicts with 
the well-settled presumption that courts should not refuse to certify a 
class merely on manageability concerns.”102 Also, a court can utilize 
many procedural tools to manage administrative burdens. For example, 
Rule 23(c) allows a district court to divide classes into subclasses or 
certify a class as to only particular issues.103 The Seventh Circuit rea-
soned that the administrative feasibility requirement forced judges to 
view administrative concerns “in a vacuum,” causing them to deny class 
certification without considering the reality that a class action may be 
the only way for small consumer claims to be effectively litigated.104 
B. The Policies Behind the Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ Weaker 
Ascertainability Standard 
The Seventh and Ninth Circuit’s standards lie somewhere in the 
middle of the ascertainability spectrum. The Seventh Circuit explicitly 
rejected any extra certification hurdles and announced that a class is 
ascertainable if its members can be identified using objective criteria.105 
More recently, the Ninth Circuit also rejected the Third Circuit’s 
stricter approach and joined ranks with the Seventh Circuit.106 When 
 
99. In re POM Wonderful LLC, No. ML 10-02199 DDP (RZx), 2014 WL 1225184, 
at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2014). 
100. Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
101. Id. at 1127–28. 
102. Id. at 1128 (citing Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 663 (7th Cir. 
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016)). 
103. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) (“When appropriate, an action may be brought 
or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.”); Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 23(c)(5) (“When appropriate, a class may be divided into subclasses 
that are each treated as a class . . . .”). 
104. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 663. 
105. Id. at 657.  
106. See Briseno, 844 F.3d at 1133. Some commentators predicted this outcome based 
on the Ninth Circuit’s reputation as the “food court.” Archis A. Parasharami & 
Daniel Jones, Ninth Circuit Rejects Meaningful Ascertainability Requirement for 
Class Certification, Cementing Deep Circuit Split, Mayer Brown: Class 
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choosing this standard, the court weighed several competing policies 
but ultimately focused on the heightened ascertainability standard’s 
effects on small-value consumer class actions. The Seventh Circuit 
sharply criticized the Third Circuit’s approach as a “doctrinal drift.”107 
The court believed that the Third Circuit’s concerns must be balanced 
against the risk of failing to certify classes in small-value consumer 
cases, where “‘only a lunatic or a fanatic’ would litigate the claim 
individually.”108 
1. A Textual Analysis of Rule 23 Suggests that the Drafters Did Not 
Intend for Courts to Apply a Separate Ascertainability Standard 
The Ninth Circuit first analyzed the text and determined that 
requiring proof of administrative feasibility before class certification is 
incompatible with Rule 23.109 The court closely examined the cer-
tification prerequisites listed in Rule 23(a) and found that the Rule’s 
language suggests that the drafters intended the list to be exhaustive.110 
The court then argued that the required superiority inquiry already 
mandates that courts consider the same manageability concerns that 
drive the heightened ascertainability requirement.111 The text supports 
the conclusion that courts should not impose an additional requirement 
in Rule 23. 
 
Defense Blog (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.classdefenseblog.com/2017/01/ 
ninth-circuit-rejects-meaningful-ascertainability-requirement-class-certification-
cementing-deep-circuit-split/ [https://perma.cc/CMK3-BZ3Y]. 
107. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 659. 
108. Id. at 665 (quoting Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th 
Cir. 2004)). 
109. See Briseno, 844 F.3d at 1125 (finding the omission of “administrative feasibility” 
from the Rule 23(a) prerequisite inquiries meaningful after examining the Rule 
using “[t]raditional canons of statutory construction”); Michael Scott Leonard, 
9th Circuit Widens Circuit Split, Declining to Adopt Rule on ‘Administrative 
Feasibility’, Westlaw J. Class Action, Jan. 18, 2017, at *1 (discussing the 
deepening split among federal appeals courts requiring class-action plaintiffs to 
propose an “administratively feasible” way to identify potential class members). 
110. See Briseno, 844 F.3d at 1125 (explaining that Rule 23(a) constitutes an exhaustive 
list). 
111. See id. at 1126 (“Imposing a separate administrative feasibility requirement would 
render th[e] manageability criterion largely superfluous, a result that contravenes 
the familiar precept that a rule should be interpreted to [give] effect to every 
clause.” (internal quotation omitted)). 
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2. The Heightened Ascertainability Requirement Frustrates Rule 23’s 
Purpose 
The Seventh Circuit admits that administrative feasibility “sounds 
sensible at first glance.”112 “Who could reasonably argue that a plaintiff 
should be allowed to certify a class whose members are impossible to 
identify?”113 But—practically speaking—“some courts have used this 
requirement to erect a nearly insurmountable hurdle at the class 
certification stage in situations where a class action is the only viable 
way to pursue valid but small individual claims.”114 The administrative 
feasibility requirement makes ascertainability a “gatekeeper” to class 
certification, which is unacceptable given that ascertainability is a 
judge-made rule.115 
The heightened standard’s practical consequences are inconsistent 
with the policies driving Rule 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) asks courts to 
compare the costs and benefits of class litigation, including “other 
methods” that could resolve the controversy.116 But the extra 
administrative feasibility requirement instead invites courts to consider 
administrative burdens in a vacuum.117 The heightened standard re-
moves an important variable from the equation: the court’s choice to 
apply the heightened standard is outcome-determinative for most small-
value consumer class actions.118 The benefits of class actions in the 
consumer context could outweigh the administrative burdens in-
volved.119 But the heightened requirement removes this important piece 
from the conversation. 
 
112. Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 662 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016). 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. The heightened standard practically precludes a court from considering any of 
Rule 23(a)’s factors until the plaintiff can establish the class members’ identity. 
Id.; Michael R. Carroll & Burt M. Rublin, 7th Circuit Rejects “Heightened” 
Ascertainability Requirement for Class Actions, Ballard Spahr, LLP (July 
30, 2015), http://www.ballardspahr.com/alertspublications/legalalerts/2015-
07-30-7th-circuit-rejects-heightened-ascertainability-requirement-for-class-
actions.aspx [https://perma.cc/6J3S-YY25].  
116. Briseno, 844 F.3d at 1128. 
117. Id. 
118. Id.; see also Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 66, at 10 (arguing that the 
practical consequence of the heightened ascertainability requirement is that “no 
case involving a low-cost consumer good purchased via a retailer may proceed 
as a class action”). 
119. See Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“The policy at 
the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that 
small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo 
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3. Corporate Malfeasance Will Go Unpunished Under the Heightened 
Ascertainability Standard 
Beyond providing consumers a way to band together to pursue 
small-value claims, the drafters intended Rule 23(b) to serve “a 
deterrent function in the marketplace.”120 The heightened ascertain-
ability requirement is troubling because “it takes class actions off the 
table as a tool to deter corporate malfeasance.”121 
Some argue that there are other ways to deter corporate 
wrongdoing. For example, the Food and Drug Administration ensures 
that food labels are accurate. Therefore, the FDA should be trusted 
with maintaining the balance between corporations and consumers.122 
But this would defeat the purpose of class actions. The drafters created 
Rule 23 partially as a response to government inaction.123 Private class 
actions under Rule 23 achieves more substantive change than regu-
latory agencies alone can achieve.124 Aggregating claims allows “an 
independent, well-financed cadre of private attorneys general to com-
pensate for the inadequacies of government regulators and individual 
litigants.”125 
Moreover, when companies expose a mass of consumers to the same 
deceptive practice, a class is often the only effective way to stop and 
redress the corporate wrongdoing. As the Supreme Court found, “small 
recoveries do not provide incentive for any individual to bring a solo 
 
action prosecuting his or her rights.”(quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 
F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997))). Arthur Miller, one of the country’s most 
recognized experts on procedure, warns that the heightened ascertainability 
requirement “threatens to render the class action procedure unavailable in the 
very small-value consumer cases that necessitated Rule 23 in the first instance.” 
Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 66, at 3. 
120. See, e.g., Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., Inc., 731 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(“[W]hen what is small is not the aggregate but the individual claim[,] . . . that’s 
the type of case in which class action treatment is most needful . . . A class action, 
like litigation in general, has a deterrent as well as a compensatory objective.”). 
121. Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 66, at 10. “[N]o matter how clear the evidence 
of wrongdoing and how definite the aggregate liability, plaintiffs have no redress 
in the typical consumer case involving small retail transactions.” Id. at 11. 
122. See Chamber of Commerce Brief, supra note 41, at 35. 
123. See Luks, supra note 25, at 2364 (explaining that the drafters crafted Rule 23 
as an “evolutionary response” to injuries unremedied by government regulation) 
(quoting Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980)). 
124. Id. at 2364–65 (“Private litigation through Rule 23 pushes enforcement of 
substantive law to a more optimal point that regulatory agencies alone would not 
be able to achieve.”). 
125. David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und 
Drang, 1953–1980, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 587, 593 (2013). 
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action prosecuting his or her rights.”126 Class actions are meant to 
overcome this problem by “aggregating the relatively paltry potential 
recoveries into something worth someone’s, usually an attorney’s, 
labor.”127 
C. The Eighth Circuit’s Standard: Rigorously Applying Rule 23’s 
Prerequisites Renders a Separate Ascertainability Requirement 
Unnecessary 
The Eighth Circuit’s standard sits opposite the Third Circuit’s 
standard on the ascertainability spectrum. The Eighth Circuit recently 
decided that a rigorous Rule 23 analysis sufficiently covers the concerns 
behind ascertainably, and the court does not apply ascertainability as 
a separate, preliminary requirement. 
In Sandusky Wellness Center, LLC v. Medtox Scientific, Inc.,128 the 
court discussed ascertainability, noting that the Eighth Circuit has not 
articulated a specific standard yet.129 The court decidedly rejected both 
the “heightened” and the “weak” versions of ascertainability and opted 
for a middle ground: “this court adheres to a rigorous analysis of the 
Rule 23 requirements, which includes that a class must be adequately 
defined and clearly ascertainable.”130 
One commentator felt the Eighth Circuit wrongly abandoned the 
separate ascertainability requirement.131 Requiring that classes at least 
be defined with reference to objective criteria would deter district courts 
from improperly expanding the ascertainability analysis.132 According 
to this commentator, the Eighth Circuit should have adopted at least 
the weak ascertainability standard, which would prevent district courts 
from potentially expanding the standard to include an administrative 
feasibility standard.133 Some of those concerns appear misguided. Based 
 
126. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. 
Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
127. Public Citizen Brief, supra note 82, at 4 (quoting Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 
617). 
128. 821 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 2016). 
129. Id. at 996. 
130. Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also McKeage v. TMBC, LLC, 847 F.3d 
992, 998 (8th Cir. 2017) (“[A]scertainability is an implicit requirement that our 
court enforces through a rigorous analysis of the Rule 23 requirements.” (quoting 
Sandusky Wellness Center, 821 F.3d at 996)). 
131. Rhys J. Williams, Note, Sandusky Wellness Center, LLC v. Medtox Scientific, 
Inc: The Eighth Circuit Joins the Ascertainability Standard Conversation, 50 
Creighton L. Rev. 155, 170 (2016). 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 177. 
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on the cases decided so far, the district courts seem to be having little 
trouble applying the Eighth Circuit’s standard.134 
Another commentator suggests that sticking with Rule 23’s text 
can mitigate some concerns behind ascertainability.135 For example, 
rigorously applying the manageability and superiority requirements 
from Rule 23 can address concerns behind the strict ascertainability 
standard. Strict ascertainability proponents argue that unascertainable 
classes are too difficult to manage without individualized inquiries. If a 
court finds class members too difficult to identify, then the court can 
deny class certification on “manageability” grounds because Rule 23 
allows a court to consider the class’ manageability at the time of 
certification.136 Courts must ask whether the actual “challenges entailed 
in the administration of [the] class are . . . so burdensome as to defeat 
certification.”137 When performing this analysis, courts must remember 
that Rule 23’s drafters understood that “class actions inherently involve 
administrative burdens, individual inquiry, and some uncertainty.”138 
Courts should be skeptical of “dismal specters paraded before them by 
defendants with regard to the action’s manageability” and instead 
proceed “in accord with the Rule’s purposes.”139 
 
134. See Lafollette v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 2:14-CV-04147-NKL, 2016 WL 
4083478, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 1, 2016) (“[The Sandusky court] did not apply 
any heightened ascertainability standard . . . [a]ccordingly, this Court will not use 
the administrative feasibility test in connection with consideration of 
ascertainability.”); Labrier v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 315 F.R.D. 503, 512 
(W.D. Mo. July 25, 2016) (declining to use the administrative feasibility standard 
because “[t]he Sandusky court . . . did not apply any heightened ascertainability 
standard”); Mojica v. Securus Techs., Inc., No. 5:14-CV-5258, 2017 WL 470910, 
at *4 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 3, 2017) (“[T]his does not mean administrative burdens 
are irrelevant to a class certification inquiry; it just means inquiry into 
administrative burdens should be shaped and guided by the Rule 23(b)(3) 
factors that properly implicate them, rather than being elevated to a separate, 
preliminary requirement for a heightened showing that has no basis in the text 
of Rule 23.”); In re Global Tel*Link Corp. ICS Litig., No. 5:14-CV-5275, 2017 
WL 471571, at *3 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 3, 2017) (same); In re Wholesale Grocery 
Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 09-MD-2090 ADM/TNL, 2016 WL 4697338, at *5 
(D. Minn. Sept. 9, 2016) (mentioning that the class members need to “be 
identified in an administratively feasible manner,” but ultimately not using that 
test and instead deciding that the class members can be identified using 
objective criteria). 
135. Geoffrey C. Shaw, Note, Class Ascertainability, 124 Yale L.J. 2354, 2396, 2403 
(2015). 
136. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D). 
137. Ries v. Ariz. Beverages USA LLC, 287 F.R.D. 523, 535 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
138. Shaw, supra note 135, at 2397. 
139. Tom Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. 
Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 501, 510 (1969). 
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These individualized inquiries might make a court concerned about 
whether a class action is truly “superior” to another form of dispute 
resolution.140 The superiority analysis would force courts to wrestle with 
what other possible resolution methods might be available. “If ‘the 
realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, 
but zero individual suits’—as Judge Posner suggested was often the 
case—then a class action with some administrative burden may still be 
‘superior’ to nothing at all.”141 
Lastly, if a court must perform extensive individual inquiries, then 
perhaps the class issues do not predominate over individual issues.142 
The main question for courts should be whether “the realities of liti-
gation . . . suggest that the class procedure is not ‘superior’ to more 
commonplace devices” and whether “individual questions of liability 
and defense will overwhelm the common questions.”143 
Even though a fixed ascertainability rule may make class action 
litigation more stable and predictable, it comes with a price: 
“forestalling precisely the kind of litigation the Rule was written to 
enable—the kind that protects ‘the small guy’ where other procedural 
mechanisms cannot.”144 
III. Ascertainability in the Future 
Based on the current legal landscape, it appears that 
ascertainability will remain an issue for consumer class actions. Even 
though—as discussed in Part II—the weaker standard is superior, there 
exists the possibility that the heightened standard will be triumphant. 
If the heightened standard wins the day, there are ways class plaintiffs 
can make do. 
 
140. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (“A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) 
is satisfied and if . . . the court finds that the questions of law or fact common 
to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly 
and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”). 
141. Shaw, supra note 135, at 2397 (citing Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 
F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
142. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
143. Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 393 (1967). 
144. Shaw, supra note 135, at 2398. 
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A. The Supreme Court May Eventually Grant Certiorari to End the 
Circuit Split. 
Commentators note that Supreme Court class-action cases seem 
favorable to the heightened standard.145 The Court appears to put 
significant weight on certain policies supporting the heightened require-
ment. For example, the Court emphasized that a district court should 
certify a class action only after a “rigorous analysis” that ensures all 
Rule 23 prerequisites are satisfied.146 The Court also pointed out that 
Rule 23 class actions must “achieve economies of time, effort, and 
expense.”147 
But, oddly enough, the Supreme Court has declined to review some 
of these high-profile ascertainability cases.148 The Supreme Court denied 
review in Mullins, even though Direct Digital had a strong argument 
for certiorari based on the circuit split.149 One scholar speculates that 
the Justices need a break on the topic, given how much attention the 
Supreme Court has provided to class actions recently.150 Or possibly the 
Supreme Court is becoming numb to certain arguments. The Court 
may have once found the threat of “blackmail pressure to settle” 
persuasive, but now the “mantra has lost its punch.”151 
 
145. See Cansler, supra note 47, at 1384 (noting that before Mullins, the Supreme 
Court’s recent class action cases suggest the Court would support the heightened 
standard). 
146. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1429 (2013). 
147. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615 (1997); see also Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) (“[Class action] claims must depend 
upon a common contention . . . capable of classwide resolution”); Max Helveston, 
Promoting Justice Through Public Interest Advocacy in Class Actions, 60 Buff. 
L. Rev. 749, 751 (2012) (“[In Wal-Mart], the Court subjected the proposed class 
to an increased level of scrutiny and appears to have raised the bar for all future 
groups seeking class certification.”). 
148. See, e.g., Mullins v. Direct Dig., Inc., 795 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016); Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497 
(6th Cir. 2015), cert denied, 136 S. Ct. 1493 (2016); Briseno v. ConAgra 
Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2017), cert denied, 2017 WL 1365592 
(2017). 
149. Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions Part II: A Respite from the Decline, 92 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 971, 979–80 (2017); see also Mullins, 795 F.3d at 662, cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016) (mem). 
150. See Klonoff, supra note 149, at 12–13 (“[The Justices are] not especially eager to 
add class action cases to the docket.”). 
151. Id. Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly disparaged the “blackmail 
settlement” rationale, other courts have done so recently. See, e.g., In re 
Oppenheimer Rochester Funds Grp. Sec. Litig., 318 F.R.D. 435, 440 (D. Colo. 
2015) (characterizing the argument about “unfair” pressure to settle for reasons 
wholly unrelated to the merits as “transparent hyperbole”); Ebin v. Kangadis 
Food Inc., 297 F.R.D. 561, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that the alleged pressure 
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Some commentators speculate that the decision not to accept 
certiorari on these high-profile cases may have been influenced more by 
the Court’s internal politics after Justice Scalia’s death than the merits 
of the case.152 Without Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court’s conservative 
wing was without a clear path to five votes.153 But Justice Gorsuch’s 
confirmation may change that. Commentators speculate that Justice 
Gorsuch is pro-business, but it is too early to tell whether “he will prod 
his fellow justices to revive Justice Antonin Scalia’s years-long cam-
paign to reign in class actions.”154 Gorsuch participated in only a few 
class-action cases while on the United States Court of Appeals Tenth 
Circuit, where he generally—but not always—ruled for the defense.155 
B. Congress May Codify the Heightened Standard 
The House of Representatives passed a bill that would codify the 
heightened ascertainability standard.156 The bill’s proponents make the 
same arguments addressed in this Note.157 They argue that the bill 
 
to settle “is common to virtually all class actions, so that if it were a sufficient 
argument to defeat certification, virtually no class actions would ever be 
certified”). 
152. Justice Scalia authored many of the Supreme Court’s recent landmark class action 
cases. Amanda Bronstad, To Defense Bar’s Dismay, SCOTUS Rejects Review of 
Class Action, NAT’L L.J. (Mar. 2, 2016), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/ 
id=1202751230219 [https://perma.cc/QDT2-CYCW]. 
153. Id. 
154. Alison Frankel, SCOTUS Case Will Test Justice Gorsuch’s Appetite for Class 
Action Limits, Reuters (May 8, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/otc-
gorsuch-idUSKBN18424X [https://perma.cc/XFU5-E99A]. 
155. Amy Howe, A Closer Look at Judge Neil Gorsuch and Class Actions, 
SCOTUSBlog (Mar. 8, 2017, 2:07 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/ 
closer-look-judge-neil-gorsuch-class-actions/ [https://perma.cc/M87T-U9S5]. 
156. See Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017, H.R. 985, 115th Cong. 
§ 1718(a) (2017); see also Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 
2017, H.R. Rep. No. 115-25,  at 4 (2017) [hereinafter Fairness in Class 
Action Litigation] (discussing the purported rationales for the Act—namely, 
to protect consumers from unscrupulous lawyers and to prevent abusive 
litigation practices). Some commentators call this “[a] chilling little bill” that 
“could have the effect of ending the class action as an American institution.” 
Chris Sagers & Joshua P. Davis, Proposed Law Could Be a New Attack on Civil 
Rights, N.Y. Times (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/13/ 
business/dealbook/class-action-proposed-law.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/9376-
KN9Y]. 
157. See, e.g., Sabrina Eaton, House Votes to Restrict Class Action Lawsuits Over 
Consumer Group Objections, Cleveland.com (Mar. 9, 2017, 10:09 PM), 
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2017/03/house_restricts_class_acti
on_l.html [https://perma.cc/6H3W-7DZZ] (quoting a Virginia representative 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 1·2017 
Navigating the Ascertainability Spectrum 
239 
addresses “the small individual recoveries [that] class action lawsuits 
sometimes generate” and “the large lawyers’ fees and anecdotes that 
make lawsuits seem ridiculous.”158 
The bill would have very real consequences: “[m]ost claims will be 
much harder to bring on a class basis.”159 For example, an antitrust 
class action challenging price-fixing by foreign manufacturers for goods 
sold to United States customers may never come to fruition because it 
would be impossible to show that every purchaser paid inflated prices.160 
Without a class action, individuals would have no practical way to seek 
recovery “and foreign corporations would be free to prey on American 
consumers.”161 
Some United States Representatives expressed that this bill 
“represents the latest attempt to tilt the civil justice playing field in 
favor of corporate defendants and to deny consumers and members of 
the public access to justice.”162 The Representatives express many con-
cerns about the bill, including that “the bill is a solution in search of a 
problem” because it is based on the false premise that “[f]ederal courts 
are routinely failing to comply with the rigorous requirements for 
certifying class actions specified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23.”163 The Representatives feel that the bill “undermines the core 
purpose of class actions,” which includes “provid[ing] access to courts 
for parties that, individually, would not have the incentive or resources 
to pursue otherwise meritorious claims.”164 Lastly, the Representatives 
believe that the bill substantially and needlessly “increase[s] resource 
burdens on the Federal courts, significantly reduce[s] judicial discretion 
in many respects, and unnecessarily circumvent[s] the . . . Rules 
Enabling Act process for amending Federal civil procedure rules.”165 
 
stating that “lawyers are often the only winners from ‘frivolous class action 
lawsuits’ that rip off businesses and consumers”). 
158. Sagers & Davis, supra note 156 (“That is all quite misleading and it is a shame.”). 
159. Id.; see also Lydia Wheeler, House Passes Bill to Curb Class-Action Lawsuits, 
Hill (Mar. 9, 2017, 7:22 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/ 
323313-house-passes-bill-to-curb-class-action-lawsuits [https://perma.cc/X26E-
KFNQ] (interviewing Maryland Representative Jamie Raskin who states that the 
bill “doesn’t formally abolish the class-action mechanism . . . It’s not the guillotine, 
but it’s a straight jacket.”). 
160. Sagers & Davis, supra note 156. 
161. Id. 
162. Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act, supra note 156, at 45. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 45–46. 
165. Id. at 46. 
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C. How Class Plaintiffs Can Combat the Heightened Standard 
Because the heightened standard could be adopted by the Supreme 
Court or codified by Congress, class-action plaintiffs need ways to 
withstand the heightened standard. One possible solution to the admin-
istrative feasibility problem is electronic receipts.166 Even without 
electronic receipts, district courts should actively utilize their right to 
modify class definitions and help viable small-value consumer class ac-
tions move past the certification stage and on to discovery. 
1. Modern Technology Can Help Ascertain Class Members 
A growing number of businesses utilize electronic receipts.167 In 
2012, a third of retailers offered digital receipts, and half of them did 
so at all of their stores.168 As this trend continues to grow, and more 
consumers grow accustomed to electronic receipts, class plaintiffs may 
be able to rely on these electronic receipts to prove their class mem-
bership. Potential class members can simply scan their email for their 
grocery store receipt and then submit proof that they are class 
members. 
Not only can technology help consumers prove their class 
membership, it can also help courts send adequate notice to class 
members. Heightened ascertainability proponents worry that class 
members are not receiving adequate notice. But pending revisions to 
Rule 23 contemplate a new spin on notice: social media.169 The rampant 
 
166. There are important privacy concerns regarding electronic receipts that are 
beyond the scope of this Note. For a discussion of the privacy concerns behind 
digital receipts, see, for example, Herb Weisbaum, Paper or Email? Pros and 
Cons of Digital Receipts, CNBC (Jan. 23, 2014, 2:52 PM), http://www. 
cnbc.com/2014/01/23/paper-or-email-pros-and-cons-of-digital-receipts.html 
[https://perma.cc/663L-VC2M]. 
167. See Wendy Koch, Retailers Find Profits with Paperless Receipts, USA Today 
(Nov. 3, 2012, 11:46 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/ 
11/03/retailers-e-mail-digital-paperless-receipts/1675069/ [https://perma.cc/C5P 
2-WF9Q] (“[M]ore stores and banks are offering to e-mail shoppers their receipts 
rather than giving them a printed copy.”); see also Stephanie Clifford, Shopper 
Receipts Join Paperless Age, N.Y. Times (Aug. 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2011/08/08/technology/digital-receipts-at-stores-gain-in-popularity.html 
[https://perma.cc/2P7N-Z3N5] (“Major retailers, including Whole Foods Market, 
Nordstrom, Gap Inc., . . . Anthropologie, Patagonia, Sears and Kmart, have begun 
offering electronic versions of receipts . . . .”). 
168. See Koch, supra note 167 (relying on a survey by the marketing firm Epsilon). 
169. See Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Report of the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 442 (June 12–13 2017), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2017-06-standing-agenda_book_ 
0.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7LT-4JZF] (authorizing notice by “electronic means”). 
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growth of social media outlets potentially allows the court to reach class 
members through websites like Facebook or Twitter. 
2. District Courts Should Take a Larger Role in Aiding Classes 
Class plaintiffs may try relying on the district courts to show mercy 
on viable small-value consumer claims. District courts are not bound 
by the class definition that the parties propose in the complaint.170 They 
have “considerable flexibility” to modify the proposed class definition 
if it is too broad, narrow, or imprecise.171 “In fact, the court has a duty 
to ensure that the class is properly constituted.”172 With all the scholar-
ship surrounding the ascertainability issue and its effects on consumer 
class actions, district courts should take a bigger role in shaping 
allegedly unascertainable class definitions to meet the standard so the 
class can pass the certification stage. With more discovery, class 
members may be able to produce better evidence demonstrating their 
membership in the class, and the class action can move forward. 
Conclusion 
The policies behind the heightened ascertainability standard are 
not strong enough to support the requirement’s practical consequences: 
low-value consumer class actions cannot be sustained in federal court. 
If class plaintiffs find themselves facing the heightened ascertainability 
requirement, the trend toward electronic receipts could help individuals 
demonstrate their class membership. Regardless, district courts should 
help consumer class actions re-define their class definitions to make it 
past the certification stage and to give those class actions a fighting 
chance. 
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170. McLaughlin, supra note 32, § 4:2; see also James Wm. Moore et al., 
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court may, in its discretion, grant certification but modify the definition of the 
proposed class to provide the necessary precision to correct other deficiencies.”). 
171. McLaughlin, supra note 32, § 4:2. 
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